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Abstract—Physically unclonable functions are used for IP
protection, hardware authentication and supply chain security.
While many PUF constructions have been put forward in the past
decade, only few of them are applicable to FPGA platforms.
Strict constraints on the placement and routing are the main
disadvantages of the existing PUFs on FPGAs, because they
place a high effort on the designer. In this paper we propose
a new delay-based PUF construction called Monte Carlo PUF,
that does not require low-level placement and routing control.
This construction relies on the on-chip Monte Carlo method that
is applied for measuring the delays of logic elements in order to
extract a unique device fingerprint. The proposed construction
allows a trade-off between the evaluation time and the error rate.
The Monte Carlo PUF is implemented and evaluated on Xilinx
Spartan-6 FPGAs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern communication systems face numerous security
challenges related to entity and data authentication, as well as
data confidentiality and integrity. These challenges can only
be addressed using cryptography, which requires methods for
secure key generation and storage. In addition, supply-chain
security issues are gaining more importance due to an increas-
ing number of counterfeiting incidents and recycled integrated
circuits (ICs) [1]. For FPGA applications, IP licensing and
management is handled using bitstream encryption. In this
case, device-specific keys are necessary in order to prevent
cloning the IP cores. These problems can be mitigated using
physically unclonable functions (PUFs) [2].
PUFs are security primitives that rely on the manufactur-
ing variations of transistor and wire parameters, to produce
unique IC identifiers. The security of these primitives relies
on their uniqueness – the ability of the design to produce
different identifiers on different devices based on identical
circuits with identical layouts. In addition to uniqueness, a very
important property of PUFs is their reliability – the ability to
produce the same identifier on the same device after multiple
measurements across a range of operating conditions. PUF
constructs can be classified into two categories: strong PUFs
where the number of identifier bits scales exponentially with
circuit area, and weak PUFs where the number of PUF bits
scales subexponentially (usually linearly) with area.
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Many PUF constructions have been presented in literature
in recent years but not all of them are suitable for FPGA
implementations. The concept of a PUF was first introduced
in [2] while the first silicon PUF was presented in [3].
Memory-based PUFs extract identifier bits from the power-
up states of metastable elements. Examples are the SRAM-
based PUF [4], latch-based PUF [5], flip-flop based PUF [6],
buskeeper PUF [7] and butterfly PUF [8]. Some memory-based
PUFs are not suitable for FPGA implementations because they
rely on specialized ASIC cells – this is the case with the
buskeeper PUF. SRAM blocks and flip-flops are available on
all FPGAs but their states are usually reset after power-up
which makes them unsuitable for generating device identifiers.
The butterfly PUF [8] is suitable for any FPGA but it requires
dedicated routing to achieve the balanced structure.
Delay-based PUFs exploit the timing variations of logic
circuits. Some well known examples are the arbiter PUF [9],
[10], ring-oscillator (RO) PUF [11], [12] and glitch PUF [13].
The main disadvantage of delay-based PUFs on FPGA is the
increased design effort. The RO PUF requires identical layouts
of the used ring-oscillators, and the arbiter PUF relies on
balancing dual signal paths.
In this paper we present a novel PUF construction called the
Monte Carlo PUF. This structure is a delay-based PUF. Unlike
the existing delay-PUF constructions which rely on racing the
signals along the different paths, the proposed construction
relies on measuring the delays of the logic elements and then
comparing them to generate a PUF response. The Monte Carlo
PUF consists of an on-chip measurement setup that applies
the Monte Carlo methodology to determine and compare
delays of individual logic elements. This PUF falls into the
category of weak PUFs because the number of extracted bits
is proportional to the number of logic elements used for the
delay measurement. The Monte Carlo PUF is suitable for
both ASIC and FPGA implementations, but in this paper
we focus on a Xilinx FPGA implementation using CARRY4
primitives [14]. These primitives are typically used for the
synthesis of high-speed adders and multipliers. The advantage
of using CARRY4 primitives in the Monte Carlo PUF is
that these hardware modules can be cascaded using dedicated
routing paths, which doesn’t require additional effort of the
designer. Half of the slices available on the Xilinx Spartan-
6 FPGA contains CARRY4 primitives, and similar primitives
exist on FPGAs from other families and vendors [15]. Several
PUFs that utilize CARRY4 elements have been presented in
the previous years [16], [17].
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(b) Timing of signal x3x2x1x0.
Fig. 1: Setup configuration for measuring buffer delays using the Monte Carlo methodology.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a
brief overview of the PUF quality metrics. In Section III we
present the concept of the Monte Carlo PUF and discuss the
operating principle and the generic architecture. Section IV
explores the implementation of the Monte Carlo PUF on a
Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA. In that section we present the results
of the initial experimental analysis of the CARRY4 elements.
In Section V we analyze the uniqueness and reliability of the
implemented PUF and explore the trade-off between the error
rate and evaluation time. We conclude the paper and discuss
future work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The quality of PUFs is usually measured using three main
quality metrics:
• Uniqueness
• Reliability
• Randomness
Uniqueness is usually evaluated in terms of between-class
Hamming distance. This distance is computed by collecting
responses of many PUF instances and computing their average
Hamming distance. Ideally, this distance should be approxi-
mately half of the width of the response.
Reliability is assessed in terms of the bit-error rate. The
bit-error rate is obtained by evaluating the same PUF instance
many times and computing the relative average Hamming
distance. An ideal PUF has an error rate of 0 %. In practice,
the error rates of up to 5 % are tolerable because they can be
corrected using the error-correcting codes.
Randomness of a PUF is evaluated in terms of entropy. Min-
entropy is the most conservative measure of unpredictability
and it is defined as the minimal amount of information that
is obtained from any observation of a random variable. It is
computed as:
H∞(X) = −log2(Pr(xmax)) , (1)
where xmax is the most likely outcome of variable X .
III. THE MONTE CARLO PUF
A. HW setup for Monte-Carlo measurements
The Monte Carlo method is an algorithm that can be used
for numerical integration, simulations of physical systems and
measurements of physical quantities. It uses samples from a
uniform distribution to obtain the numerical approximations
of the measured quantities.
An example of a Monte-Carlo-based experiment for mea-
suring delays of logic elements is illustrated in Figure 1. The
measurement setup consists of a free-running, possibly noisy,
ring oscillator, three cascaded delay buffers (denoted by A, B
and C), and a 4-bit register sampled by the system clock with
period Tclk. T0 is the period of the ring oscillator. For CMOS
circuits, a 0→ 1 delay is different from a 1→ 0 delay because
different transistors are used in the pull-up and the pull-down
networks. Therefore, for each buffer there are two delay values
denoted by dA,0→1,dA,1→0,dB,0→1,dB,1→0,dC,0→1,dC,1→0.
We assume that the sum of all six delays is lower than T0.
This condition is easy to achieve by using a sufficiently slow
ring oscillator. We further assume that the ring oscillator is not
interlocked with the system clock. This requires some care in
choice of the sampling frequency. We recommend to choose
the ratio Tclk/T0 that cannot be represented as a ratio of small
integers. The uniformity of RO phase at sampling moments is
ensured by this carefully chosen ratio and by the noise in the
circuit.
The goal of the experiment is to determine buffer delays
relative to the value T0. The hardware setup for the experiment
is shown in Figure 1a. The setup operates as follows: The ring
Fig. 2: The generic architecture of the Monte Carlo PUF.
oscillator is started andN consecutive samples of the 4-bit reg-
ister are taken at times Tclk, 2Tclk, ...NTclk. These values are
collected and counted. The right part of the Figure 1a shows
the 8 possible values of the signal x3x2x1x0 that could be
sampled. Signal x3x2x1x0 goes through these 8 values during
each period T0 as shown in Figure 1b. The measurement setup
operates by sampling this signal many times and counting
the appearances of each pattern. If the sampling moments are
uniformly distributed across the phase of the ring oscillator,
the counts of each pattern are proportional to delays of the
elements. The delay corresponding to each pattern is indicated
in Figure 1a.
Let N0011 denote the number of times the value 0011 is
sampled. For each sample, the probability p0011 of sampling
value 0011 is proportional to a delay of the buffer B.
p0011 =
dB,1→0
T0
. (2)
The counter value N0011 after N trials is a random variable
with binomial distribution.
Pr(N0011 = k) =
(
N
k
)
pk
0011
(1− p0011)
N−k . (3)
The mean of this distribution is:
E(N0011) = N · p0011 = N ·
dB,1→0
T0
. (4)
Therefore, the delay of the buffer B can be approximated
by:
dB,1→0 = T0 ·
N0011
N
. (5)
Other delays can be computed in the same manner using
the corresponding counter values.
The standard deviation of the distribution of N0011 is
σ(N0011) =
√
N · p0011(1− p0011) =
=
√
N ·
dB,1→0
T0
·
(
1−
dB,1→0
T0
)
.
(6)
The relative error of the approximation is proportional to
the ratio σ(N0011)/E(N0011).
σ(N0011)
E(N0011)
=
√
T0 − dB,1→0
N · dB,1→0
. (7)
A higher number N of trials results in higher precision
of the measurement procedure. We note that using a very
slow RO results in many all-zero and all-ones values captured
in the 4-bit register. These captured values are not used for
computing the buffer delays. Therefore, increasing the period
T0 leads to a higher ratio of unused samples which reduces
the measurement precision.
B. PUF architecture
The Monte Carlo PUF is based on comparing the delays
of two logic elements with identical layouts and generating
a single response bit as a result of the comparison. These
delays are determined using the Monte Carlo methodology.
The methodology can be used for comparing both 0→ 1 and
1→ 0 delays, potentially extracting two response bits from a
singe pair. However, these response bits may be correlated.
The generic architecture of the Monte Carlo PUF is shown
in Figure 2. The ring oscillator is used to produce a signal
that is propagated through two delay lines. Two registers are
used to capture the position of the signal edge and to update
the counter values. As shown in Figure 1a, a specific pattern
corresponds to each delay. A setup for comparing the 0 → 1
delays of the two highlighted buffers in Figure 2 is shown
in the right part of the Figure. Every time a corresponding
pattern is detected in Reg1, the counter value is incremented,
if it is detected in Reg2 the counter value is decremented. If
both registers contain this pattern, or if neither of them do, the
counter value is not changed. The response bit value denotes
the slower element, 1 if it is the left one, and 0 if it is the right
one. This bit is the sign bit of the counter at the end of the
measurement because the response depends only on whether
the final counter value is positive or negative.
We note that, in order to ensure that the result depends on
the process variations rather than the systematic variations,
it is required that the two delay lines have identical layouts.
However, there is no such requirement for individual buffers
within the same delay line because the two buffers on the same
delay line are never compared to produce a bit.
The design parameters of the Monte Carlo PUF are:
• Tclk–Sampling clock period. The value of this parameter
doesn’t affect the properties of PUF. A high-speed clock
can be used in order to improve the evaluation time.
• T0–Ring oscillator-period. The value of this parameter
has to be chosen carefully. T0/2 should be higher than
the cumulative delay of the delay line in order to ensure
the proper operation of the Monte Carlo PUF. However,
high value of T0 leads to reduced precision of the Monte
Carlo measurements and the increased bit error rate.
• k– The number of buffers on the delay line.
• N – The number of Monte Carlo trials per evaluation.
The value of this parameter is used to make trade-offs
between the bit error rate and the evaluation time.
Fig. 3: The basic implementation of the Monte Carlo PUF.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ON SPARTAN-6
A. Basic Implementation
For our implementation platform we used a Xilinx Spartan-
6 FPGA. This type of FPGA contains three types of slices
called SliceX, SliceL and SliceM. The slices of type X don’t
contain the CARRY4 primitive. These slices comprise 50 %
of all available slices. Slices of type L and M each comprise
25 % of the FPGA slices. Newer Xilinx FPGAs and SoCs
such as Virtex6 [18] and ZYNQ-7000 [19] contain CARRY4
primitives on every slice. These slices contain the CARRY4
primitives and can be used for implementing the delay lines.
We assume that slices of the same type have identical layouts.
For this reason, in all of our implementations, the delay lines
are implemented using slices of the same type (either both L
or both M).
Figure 3 shows the basic implementation of the Monte
Carlo PUF consisting of a ring oscillator implemented using a
single look-up table (LUT) and two CARRY4 elements. Each
CARRY4 primitive is configured to operate as a tapped delay
line, with the output of each stage connected to a flip-flop
inside the same slice. Using this implementation, six identifier
bits can be extracted – three by comparing the delays of the
0 → 1 transitions and three by comparing the delays of the
1→ 0 transitions.
B. Initial Experiment Results
An initial study was performed on 1337 instances of basic
Monte Carlo PUFs implemented on a single FPGA. Six identi-
fier bits are extracted from each instance and the probabilities
of all 64 combinations are computed. In order to examine the
correlation between the bits extracted using the rising edge
and those extracted using the falling edge, the results are
represented in the form of the heat map as shown in Figure 4.
It can be seen that the delays of the 0 → 1 transitions are
highly correlated with the delays of the 1 → 0 transitions. If
all six bits are used, the resulting identifier would have only
4.5 bits of min-entropy (0.75 per response bit). The same trend
Fig. 4: Heat map showing the probabilities (%) of the six
identifier bits extracted from carry chains – three bits using
the rising edge and three using the falling edge.
is observed when the experiment was repeated on a different
FPGA.
Based on the results of this experiment, we decided to use
only three bits per basic PUF instance to construct an identifier.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the 3-bit responses obtained
using the 0 → 1 delay measurements. The distribution is not
uniform as it fails the χ2-test. This non-uniformity is most
likely caused by the global variations within a single slice
which cause correlations between the response bits. Based
on the estimated probabilities, the response contains 2.5 bits
of min-entropy (0.83 bits of min-entropy per response bit).
Similar result was obtained when the experiment was repeated
on another FPGA chip.
Further improvements in entropy per bit, could be made by
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Fig. 5: The distribution of the 3-bit responses obtained from
1337 PUF instances on a single FPGA.
using only two least-correlated bits per CARRY4. Our exper-
iments show that this results in only a minor improvement
in entropy per bit, as all three combinations produce between
0.85 and 0.9 min-entropy per response bit. In the remainder of
this paper, we are using the 3-bit version of the Monte Carlo
PUF.
C. Discussion
Typical application of weak PUFs is for secure key gen-
eration and storage. For the purpose of evaluating uniqueness
and reliability, we’ve implemented a 128 bit key generator. We
note that in practice, more than 128 PUF bits are necessary
to produce a 128 bit key. This is, in part, because the
PUF response, doesn’t have the full entropy – based on the
empirical estimation a 128 bit PUF response contains less than
107 bits of min-entropy. In addition, some entropy may be lost
due to the error-correcting procedure.
A 100 MHz clock signal generated by an on-board quartz
oscillator was used for sampling. We note that the correct
operation of the Monte Carlo PUF doesn’t depend on the
clock frequency, but only on the ratio Tclk/T0. This leaves
the opportunity for improving the evaluation time by using an
asynchronous high-speed ring oscillator for sampling.
Interlock of the oscillators is a possible threat to the func-
tionality of the Monte Carlo PUF. The Monte Carlo measure-
ment methodology relies on the uniformity of sampling. If the
RO and the sampling oscillator are interlocked, the sampled
phases are no longer uniformly distributed. This problem can
be addressed by replacing a single-LUT RO with a structure
with a period that changes in a pseudo-random manner. In
addition, the counter values can be used to implement the on-
the-fly testing procedure to detect problems at run time. These
ideas will be explored in future work.
V. PUF CHARACTERIZATION
A 128-bit PUF instance is implemented using 43 basic 3-
bit PUF structures. Hamming distances between two 128-bit
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Fig. 6: Distribution of HD from 1000 evaluations of a single
128-bit PUF instance.
PUFs across ten chip instances are used to evaluate reliability
and uniqueness of the Monte Carlo PUF on Spartan-6.
A. Reliability
To evaluate the reliability of proposed PUF, output trails
from a single 128-bit Monte Carlo PUF instance are collected.
To test the influence of the number N of the measurements
on the error rate, this Monte Carlo PUF is operated with three
different parameter values: N = 10 000, N = 100 000 and
N = 200000. For each value of N , 1000 output trails are
recorded and analysed. One output trial is selected from these
three sets of 1000 output trails and regarded as the reference
trial. All Hamming distances between the reference output trail
and all other trails are calculated. The possible values of these
Hamming distances are within the range [0, 128].
The probability densities of having any possible Hamming
Distance are plotted in Figure 6. The bit error rates in average
are 15.1% for N = 10 000, 7.1% for N = 100 000 and 2.26%
for N = 200 000. As expected, an increase in the number N
of Monte Carlo iterations will lead to a reduction in the bit
error rate. In other words, the reliability can be improved by
choosing a larger N . Evaluation time for 200K measurement
using on-board 100 MHz clock is 2 ms. This evaluation
time can be improved by using high-speed asynchronous ring
oscillators for measurement.
B. Uniqueness
In order to evaluate the uniqueness, ten disjoint 128-bit
PUF instances are implemented on ten different FPGA chips.
There are, in total, 100 different output trails. Uniqueness
can be demonstrated by examining the Hamming distances
between any two output trails. All 4950 Hamming distances
are measured and plotted on Figure 7. The mean of these
Hamming distances is 63.98 (minimum 41, maximum 86).
It means that a 128-bit Monte Carlo PUF instance will, in
average, have half of its PUF bits different from another 128-
bit Monte Carlo PUF instance.
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Fig. 7: Uniqueness.
TABLE I: Implementation Results.
Utilization for 3-bit response 38 slices (59 FFs + 90 LUTs)
Utilization for 128-bit response 1662 slices (2537 FFs + 3871 LUTs)
Evaluation time 2 ms (20000 cycles at 100MHz)
Bit error rate 2.26%
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel Monte-Carlo-based
PUF which is suitable for FPGA applications. It relies on a
measurement procedure that determines the delays of logic
elements. A response bit is generated by comparing the
measured delays of two logic elements. An implementation
on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA is presented and analyzed. The
results show that the proposed PUF provides a high uniqueness
and a low error rate. Results of the reference implementation
are summarized in Table I.
In future work, we will investigate the PUF behavior under
changing operating conditions. In addition, several hardware
implementation aspects remain to be explored. In particular, a
reduction of the evaluation time using asynchronous oscillators
for sampling, and a reduction of the area by sharing resources
(oscillators and counters) between different PUF instances,
will be considered. PUF implementations on various FPGA
families from different vendors remain to be explored.
The final goal of this work is to build up a complete PUF-
based key generator including error correcting codes and pri-
vacy amplification (entropy compression), and to demonstrate
the use of the Monte Carlo PUF in a security system.
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